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Planetary missions to Mars and Other Icy worlds 
such as Enceladus, Europa and Titan have the 
burden of not contaminating the planetary envi-
ronment in the course of exploration (1).  Mis-
sions that collect and bring back samples from 
these destinations have added requirement of ac-
cidental release of the samples into earth atmos-
phere.  Planetary protection from forward and 
backward contaminations impose stringent relia-
bility requirements on sample return missions es-
pecially on the design of the earth entry system 
and in the engineering of it. This proposed 
presentation will review past efforts and assess 
what emerging technologies could be used to ad-
dress the reliability requirements. 
 
Between 1997 and 2002, NASA working in part-
nership with CNES performed an end-to-end mis-
sion design study including earth entry phase.  
Probabilistic risk analysis was performed to lay 
the foundation for establishing a basis for the de-
sign elements to meet the overall planetary pro-
tection requirement (Ref 2, 3).   Efforts such as 
chute-less entry capsule that are designed to with-
stand direct impact were focused on improving 
the reliability of the overall mission by making 
the entry segment entirely passive (4).  
 
“ As has been indicated by the National Academy 
of Sciences for scientific reasons, the possibility 
that the samples might be harmful, therefore, all 
the elements of the mission architecture must as-
sure containment of the samples from the time of 
their acquisition through final disposition.  The 
probability of containment not being assured 
(CNA) is 1.0E-06,” from ref (2).  The study per-
formed in 2002 and reported out in 2004 looked 
at direct entry using an earth entry vehicle (EEV) 
and a Shuttle transfer system where the sample 
will be brought down to earth using Shuttle.  
Since Space Shuttle program no longer exists, the 
feasible options are direct earth entry vehicle or 
using Orion capsule instead of the Space Shuttle 
orbiter.  For this proposed presentation, we will 
focus on the former and specifically the EEV.    
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 (included at the end) are 
taken from Ref. 2 and they illustrate why EDL 
Segment needs to be robust.   Earth targeted 
Cruise mission phase and earth targeting are two 
important mission segments have the two largest 
contributions (54% and 15%) and there are many 
ways to achieve the required reliability.  The next 
biggest contributor is the entry segment (7.6%) 
and the remaining EDL segments are not far be-
hind including the post impact or recovery seg-
ment.  The focus of this presentation is to both as-
sess the state of the art entry system and errone-
ous assumptions made in the past studies and ad-
dress options that may become available to design 
and demonstrate the entry system that could pos-
sibly meet the stringent requirement of CAN not 
higher than 2.6E-07 for the entry system.   
 
In the (1997 – 2002) study, the heritage Carbon 
Phenolic (CP) material, utilized on Pioneer Venus 
and Galileo, was baselined as the ablative thermal 
protection material.  The EEV was a direct im-
pact, parachute-less design as shown in   Figure 2. 
 
The heat-shield material that was baselined for the 
MSR-EEV was heritage Carbon-Phenolic (HCP).  
The heuristic argument that led to the selection of 
the heat-shield material HCP are problematic due 
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to the assumptions made and also the manufactur-
ing of HCP has atrophied.  The argument for 
baselining HCP went some thing like this.  “Giv-
en that the Venus and Jupiter entry environments 
are much more severe than the Sample Return 
Environments and the large amount of flight data 
for non-civilian uses it has been assumed that one 
can demonstrate that a CP system can meet the 
reliability requirements.”   
 
However HCP has its own challenges and risks 
associated with it.  A HCP heat-shield consists of 
two versions of CP, one of which has not been 
manufactured for entry missions since Galileo and 
the flight heritage of that material is much more 
limited to just two missions (Galileo and Pioneer-
Venus) or 5 probes.  Given that there are two ver-
sion of HCP to make one heat-shield, it requires 
the heatshield to have a seam between the two 
components which introduces additional verifica-
tion challenges.  HCP is also susceptible to inher-
ent failure modes due to its 2D laminated struc-
ture.   
 
Recent SMD and STMD funded activities 
have looked at the use of 3D Weaving to develop 
TPS materials with material architectures that are 
inherently more robust than 2D systems and also 
they are not simply one material but a family of 
materials. In 2012 and 2013, under the 3-D Wo-
ven TPS project, a family of materials, single and 
multi-layer materials were woven, some resin in-
fused and others were not, and these materials 
were arc jet tested to understand the performance 
limit and failure modes.  The family of ablative 
TPS materials manufactured and tested are shown 
in Figure 3 and also shown on this figure are three 
heritage materials, namely Carbon-Phenolic, 
Avcoat and PICA.   
 
Recent work under the Heat-shield for Extreme 
Entry Environment Technology (HEEET) project 
have demonstrated acreage materials that are ro-
bust to entry environments of 5000+ W/cm2 and 
above 5 atm. pressure, well in excess of that for 
sample return missions which are around 1500 
W/cm2 (margined) of peak heat-flux and under 
0.4 atm of peak pressure during earth entry.  In 
Figure 4, the thermal testing performed in com-
parison to a range of Venus and Saturn missions 
are shown.  It is very exciting to note that the 3-D 
Woven, acreage material selected for Venus and 
Saturn missions under the HEEET project has not 
shown any type of failure at any of these test 
points.   
 
Knowledge gained during the HEEET project has 
provided insights into the complexities associated 
with weaving, resin infusion and other steps in-
volved in making a robust heat-shield.    
 
This proposed presentation will discuss in detail 
the challenges facing the EDL community in de-
signing an Aero-shell that can meet the planetary 
protection requirements, and the opportunities 3D 
woven heat shield offers in terms of improved 
heat-shield and back-shell TPS  compared to a 
traditional CP heatshield and some challenges that 
would need to be overcome to develop such a sys-
tem.   
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Table E-1.  EEV Mission Phase Contribution to CAN (From Ref 2) 
 5% 50% mean phase cont. 95% 
Break-the-Chain (sample isolation) 
/MAV Launch 1.1E-10 5.4E-10 1.1E-09 0.1% 2.8E-09 
Mars Orbit Rendezvous 6.7E-11 1.2E-09 6.9E-09 0.5% 1.9E-08 
Mars/Earth Transit 2.6E-10 3.3E-09 3.1E-08 2.4% 1.1E-07 
Earth Targeting 1.6E-07 5.0E-07 7.2E-07 54.2 % 2.0E-06 
Spin Eject 7.4E-11 3.5E-10 6.2E-10 0.0% 2.1E-09 
Earth Targeted Cruise 7.5E-09 8.9E-08 2.0E-07 15.1% 1.3E-06 
Entry (Thermal) 2.8E-09 2.5E-08 1.0E-07 7.6% 2.6E-07 
Descent (Structural) 1.0E-08 5.5E-08 8.8E-08 6.7% 3.0E-07 
Impact 7.3E-09 3.5E-08 7.5E-08 5.7% 2.3E-07 
After Impact 2.5E-09 2.5E-08 1.0E-07 7.6% 3.1E-07 
Residual (unclassified) 2.9E-10 7.1E-10 4.4E-10 0.0% 2.1E-09 
Total 4.6E-07 1.0E-06 1.3E-06  2.7E-06 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  EEV MSR PRA Scenario Results by Phase (Taken from Ref 2) 
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Figure 2.  Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.   3-dimensionally woven, single and multi-layer, ablative TPS materials 
manufactured and tested in (2012-2013).   Density of the family of materials are 
compared with heritage ablative TPS (HCP, AVCOAT, PICA). 
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Figure 4.  Thermal test conditions the HEEET material has been tested at in comparison to the mis-
sion profile in terms of heat-flux and pressure.  One test was conducted at 2000 W/cm2 and at 14 atm. 
stagnation pressure.  Another test was conducted at 8000 W/cm2 at the LHEML laser test facility with 
no flow.  The HEEET acreage material not only survived these extreme conditions, post-test inspection 
showed no failure modes.  In comparison, heritage CP showed anticipated failures such as spallation 
and ply separation 
 
